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authorDavid Howells2008-11-13 17:39:24 -0600
committerJames Morris2008-11-13 17:39:24 -0600
commit1d045980e1eff4800472f0e81df9460640c8eee9 (patch)
tree6c326912e7fc49cdcd02f219a22e6ffb843aceeb /security/commoncap.c
parenta6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d (diff)
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CRED: Prettify commoncap.c
Prettify commoncap.c. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c300
1 files changed, 248 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 51dfa11e8e5..19cb398431e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -40,14 +40,21 @@ int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
40 return -EPERM; 40 return -EPERM;
41 return 0; 41 return 0;
42} 42}
43
44EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); 43EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
45 44
46/* 45/**
46 * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
47 * @tsk: The task to query
48 * @cap: The capability to check for
49 * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
50 *
51 * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
52 * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
53 *
47 * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable() 54 * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
48 * function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() 55 * function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() returns 0
49 * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() 56 * when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() returns 1 for this
50 * returns 1 for this case. 57 * case.
51 */ 58 */
52int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit) 59int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
53{ 60{
@@ -60,6 +67,14 @@ int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
60 return cap_raised ? 0 : -EPERM; 67 return cap_raised ? 0 : -EPERM;
61} 68}
62 69
70/**
71 * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
72 * @ts: The time to set
73 * @tz: The timezone to set
74 *
75 * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone
76 * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.
77 */
63int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) 78int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
64{ 79{
65 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) 80 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
@@ -67,6 +82,15 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
67 return 0; 82 return 0;
68} 83}
69 84
85/**
86 * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
87 * another
88 * @child: The process to be accessed
89 * @mode: The mode of attachment.
90 *
91 * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
92 * granted, -ve if denied.
93 */
70int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) 94int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
71{ 95{
72 int ret = 0; 96 int ret = 0;
@@ -80,6 +104,13 @@ int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
80 return ret; 104 return ret;
81} 105}
82 106
107/**
108 * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
109 * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
110 *
111 * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
112 * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
113 */
83int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 114int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
84{ 115{
85 int ret = 0; 116 int ret = 0;
@@ -93,8 +124,18 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
93 return ret; 124 return ret;
94} 125}
95 126
96int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, 127/**
97 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) 128 * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets
129 * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets
130 * @effective: The place to record the effective set
131 * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set
132 * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set
133 *
134 * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns
135 * them to the caller.
136 */
137int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
138 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
98{ 139{
99 const struct cred *cred; 140 const struct cred *cred;
100 141
@@ -108,30 +149,35 @@ int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
108 return 0; 149 return 0;
109} 150}
110 151
111#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES 152/*
112 153 * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old
154 * permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not.
155 */
113static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) 156static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
114{ 157{
115 /* 158#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
116 * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited
117 * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task
118 * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
119 */
120 return cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0;
121}
122
123static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) { return 1; }
124
125#else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
126 159
127static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; } 160 /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
128static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void) 161 * capability
129{ 162 */
130 return !capable(CAP_SETPCAP); 163 if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
164 return 0;
165#endif
166 return 1;
131} 167}
132 168
133#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ 169/**
134 170 * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities
171 * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
172 * @old: The current task's current credentials
173 * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
174 * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
175 * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
176 *
177 * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current
178 * process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new
179 * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM.
180 */
135int cap_capset(struct cred *new, 181int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
136 const struct cred *old, 182 const struct cred *old,
137 const kernel_cap_t *effective, 183 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -165,6 +211,9 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
165 return 0; 211 return 0;
166} 212}
167 213
214/*
215 * Clear proposed capability sets for execve().
216 */
168static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 217static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
169{ 218{
170 cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted); 219 cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
@@ -173,6 +222,17 @@ static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
173 222
174#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES 223#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
175 224
225/**
226 * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
227 * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
228 *
229 * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
230 * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
231 * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected?
232 *
233 * Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and
234 * -ve to deny the change.
235 */
176int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 236int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
177{ 237{
178 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; 238 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -187,6 +247,14 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
187 return 1; 247 return 1;
188} 248}
189 249
250/**
251 * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode
252 * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter
253 *
254 * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
255 *
256 * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
257 */
190int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) 258int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
191{ 259{
192 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; 260 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -197,6 +265,10 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
197 return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS); 265 return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
198} 266}
199 267
268/*
269 * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
270 * to a file.
271 */
200static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, 272static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
201 struct linux_binprm *bprm, 273 struct linux_binprm *bprm,
202 bool *effective) 274 bool *effective)
@@ -232,6 +304,9 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
232 return *effective ? ret : 0; 304 return *effective ? ret : 0;
233} 305}
234 306
307/*
308 * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.
309 */
235int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps) 310int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
236{ 311{
237 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; 312 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -283,7 +358,11 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
283 return 0; 358 return 0;
284} 359}
285 360
286/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */ 361/*
362 * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
363 * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
364 * constructed by execve().
365 */
287static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective) 366static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
288{ 367{
289 struct dentry *dentry; 368 struct dentry *dentry;
@@ -342,7 +421,31 @@ static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
342#endif 421#endif
343 422
344/* 423/*
345 * set up the new credentials for an exec'd task 424 * Determine whether a exec'ing process's new permitted capabilities should be
425 * limited to just what it already has.
426 *
427 * This prevents processes that are being ptraced from gaining access to
428 * CAP_SETPCAP, unless the process they're tracing already has it, and the
429 * binary they're executing has filecaps that elevate it.
430 *
431 * Returns 1 if they should be limited, 0 if they are not.
432 */
433static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
434{
435#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
436 if (capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
437 return 0;
438#endif
439 return 1;
440}
441
442/**
443 * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
444 * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
445 *
446 * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
447 * constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
448 * which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
346 */ 449 */
347int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 450int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
348{ 451{
@@ -430,10 +533,15 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
430 return 0; 533 return 0;
431} 534}
432 535
433/* 536/**
434 * determine whether a secure execution is required 537 * cap_bprm_secureexec - Determine whether a secure execution is required
435 * - the creds have been committed at this point, and are no longer available 538 * @bprm: The execution parameters
436 * through bprm 539 *
540 * Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0
541 * if it is not.
542 *
543 * The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer
544 * available through @bprm->cred.
437 */ 545 */
438int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 546int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
439{ 547{
@@ -450,6 +558,20 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
450 cred->egid != cred->gid); 558 cred->egid != cred->gid);
451} 559}
452 560
561/**
562 * cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered
563 * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
564 * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
565 * @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to
566 * @size: The size of value
567 * @flags: The replacement flag
568 *
569 * Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if
570 * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
571 *
572 * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those
573 * who aren't privileged to do so.
574 */
453int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, 575int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
454 const void *value, size_t size, int flags) 576 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
455{ 577{
@@ -457,27 +579,41 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
457 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) 579 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
458 return -EPERM; 580 return -EPERM;
459 return 0; 581 return 0;
460 } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, 582 }
583
584 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
461 sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && 585 sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
462 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) 586 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
463 return -EPERM; 587 return -EPERM;
464 return 0; 588 return 0;
465} 589}
466 590
591/**
592 * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed
593 * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
594 * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
595 *
596 * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if
597 * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
598 *
599 * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who
600 * aren't privileged to remove them.
601 */
467int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) 602int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
468{ 603{
469 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { 604 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
470 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) 605 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
471 return -EPERM; 606 return -EPERM;
472 return 0; 607 return 0;
473 } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, 608 }
609
610 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
474 sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && 611 sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
475 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) 612 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
476 return -EPERM; 613 return -EPERM;
477 return 0; 614 return 0;
478} 615}
479 616
480/* moved from kernel/sys.c. */
481/* 617/*
482 * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of 618 * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
483 * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid. 619 * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
@@ -521,35 +657,46 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
521 new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; 657 new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
522} 658}
523 659
660/**
661 * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call
662 * @new: The proposed credentials
663 * @old: The current task's current credentials
664 * @flags: Indications of what has changed
665 *
666 * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
667 * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
668 */
524int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) 669int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
525{ 670{
526 switch (flags) { 671 switch (flags) {
527 case LSM_SETID_RE: 672 case LSM_SETID_RE:
528 case LSM_SETID_ID: 673 case LSM_SETID_ID:
529 case LSM_SETID_RES: 674 case LSM_SETID_RES:
530 /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */ 675 /* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless
676 * otherwise suppressed */
531 if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) 677 if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
532 cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old); 678 cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);
533 break; 679 break;
534 case LSM_SETID_FS:
535 /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */
536 680
537 /* 681 case LSM_SETID_FS:
682 /* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless
683 * otherwise suppressed
684 *
538 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities? 685 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
539 * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here. 686 * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
540 */ 687 */
541 if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { 688 if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
542 if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0) { 689 if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0)
543 new->cap_effective = 690 new->cap_effective =
544 cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective); 691 cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
545 } 692
546 if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0) { 693 if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0)
547 new->cap_effective = 694 new->cap_effective =
548 cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective, 695 cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
549 new->cap_permitted); 696 new->cap_permitted);
550 }
551 } 697 }
552 break; 698 break;
699
553 default: 700 default:
554 return -EINVAL; 701 return -EINVAL;
555 } 702 }
@@ -582,28 +729,50 @@ static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
582 return 0; 729 return 0;
583} 730}
584 731
585int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, 732/**
733 * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted
734 * @p: The task to affect
735 * @policy: The policy to effect
736 * @lp: The parameters to the scheduling policy
737 *
738 * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
739 * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
740 */
741int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
586 struct sched_param *lp) 742 struct sched_param *lp)
587{ 743{
588 return cap_safe_nice(p); 744 return cap_safe_nice(p);
589} 745}
590 746
591int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) 747/**
748 * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
749 * @p: The task to affect
750 * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
751 *
752 * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
753 * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
754 */
755int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
592{ 756{
593 return cap_safe_nice(p); 757 return cap_safe_nice(p);
594} 758}
595 759
596int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) 760/**
761 * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
762 * @p: The task to affect
763 * @nice: The nice value to set
764 *
765 * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
766 * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
767 */
768int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
597{ 769{
598 return cap_safe_nice(p); 770 return cap_safe_nice(p);
599} 771}
600 772
601/* 773/*
602 * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP) 774 * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Attempt to remove the specified capability from
603 * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces 775 * the current task's bounding set. Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
604 * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
605 * this task could get inconsistent info. There can be no
606 * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
607 */ 776 */
608static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap) 777static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
609{ 778{
@@ -632,6 +801,18 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
632} 801}
633#endif 802#endif
634 803
804/**
805 * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
806 * @option: The process control function requested
807 * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function
808 *
809 * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
810 * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.
811 *
812 * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
813 * here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM
814 * modules will consider performing the function.
815 */
635int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 816int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
636 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) 817 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
637{ 818{
@@ -737,13 +918,28 @@ error:
737 return error; 918 return error;
738} 919}
739 920
740int cap_syslog (int type) 921/**
922 * cap_syslog - Determine whether syslog function is permitted
923 * @type: Function requested
924 *
925 * Determine whether the current process is permitted to use a particular
926 * syslog function, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
927 */
928int cap_syslog(int type)
741{ 929{
742 if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) 930 if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
743 return -EPERM; 931 return -EPERM;
744 return 0; 932 return 0;
745} 933}
746 934
935/**
936 * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
937 * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
938 * @pages: The size of the mapping
939 *
940 * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
941 * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
942 */
747int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) 943int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
748{ 944{
749 int cap_sys_admin = 0; 945 int cap_sys_admin = 0;