| author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | |
| Tue, 16 Oct 2018 14:59:01 +0000 (16:59 +0200) | ||
| committer | Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> | |
| Tue, 16 Oct 2018 16:47:40 +0000 (12:47 -0400) | ||
| commit | a3671a4f973ee9d9621d60166cc3b037c397d604 | |
| tree | ef3c0975d7284a25fd265d63793c5edcee2d322f | tree | snapshot (tar.xz tar.gz zip) |
| parent | 0295e39595e1146522f2722715dba7f7fba42217 | commit | diff |
RDMA/ucma: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
| drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | diff | blob | history |